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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 900555 
v. : 
BRIAN E. MAGUIRE, : Category No. 12 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The sole issue presented in this petition for rehearing 
is whether the Court misapplied or misinterpreted State v. Hoff, 
No. 900096 (Utah July 3, 1991), in affirming the court of 
appeals' decision that, because the trial court had not strictly 
complied with rule 11(5), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in 
taking defendant's guilty plea, the guilty plea was automatically 
invalid and defendant must be allowed to withdraw it. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For purposes of this petition, this Court's statement 
of the case is generally sufficient: 
On August 10, 1988, defendant Brian E. 
Maguire filed a motion to withdraw his no-
contest plea to a charge of aggravated 
assault. The motion was denied. Defendant 
successfully appealed from the denial of that 
motion. In an unpublished memorandum 
decision, the court of appeals ruled that the 
trial court failed to strictly comply with 
rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and with State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987). The State petitioned for 
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Procedure and with State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987). The State petitioned for 
certiorari, which we granted, asking this 
court to decide whether the court of appeals 
had erroneously interpreted Gibbons. 
State v. Maauire, No. 900555, slip op. at 1 (Utah July 9, 1991) 
(per curiam). Relying on State v. Hoff, No. 900096 (Utah July 9, 
1991), the Court affirmed M[t]he decision of the court of appeals 
vacating defendant's conviction and remanding the case for a 
withdrawal of plea." Ibid. (A copy of the Court's opinion in 
Maauire is attached as an addendum.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts pertinent to this petition are set forth in 
the Statement of the Case, above. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In concluding that State v. Hoff is dispositive of the 
issue presented in this case, the Court has either misapplied or 
misinterpreted Hoff. That opinion, which involved a pre-
Gibbons1 plea, did not address the specific question of which 
test applies in appellate review of a post-Gibbons guilty plea — 
"strict compliance" or "record as a whole". Nor did Gibbons 
resolve that issue, which is squarely presented in the instant 
case. 
Therefore, the Court should grant rehearing and fully 
address the question of which test is to be applied by an 
appellate court in the review of the validity of a post-Gibbons 
guilty plea. As the State has argued, a "strict compliance" 
1
 State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). 
2 
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test, with its automatic reversal component, is an unnecessarily 
inflexible approach which fails to consider the reality of the 
situation in many cases — i.e., that even though the trial court 
may not have strictly complied with each element of rule 11, the 
defendant's guilty plea was entirely knowing and voluntary. On 
the other hand, the traditional "record as a whole" test allows 
an appellate court to let stand a guilty plea where the trial 
court has not strictly complied with rule 11 and Gibbons but the 
record, viewed in its entirety, establishes that the defendant's 
plea was knowing and voluntary. 
INTRODUCTION 
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court 
has misapplied or misinterpreted the law. See Cummins v. 
Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913). The 
argument portion of this brief will demonstrate that the State's 
petition for rehearing is properly before the Court and should be 
granted. 
ARGUMENT 
IN CONCLUDING THAT STATE V. HOFF WAS 
DISPOSITIVE OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED IN THIS 
CASE, THE COURT OVERLOOKED THAT IN HOFF, IT 
DID NOT DECIDE THE CRITICAL QUESTION OF WHAT 
TEST APPLIES IN APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE 
VALIDITY OF A POST-GIBBONS GUILTY PLEA. 
The issue presented in this case is whether the court 
of appeals correctly concluded that under State v. Gibbons, 740 
P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), a trial court's failure to strictly comply 
with rule 11(5), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Gibbons 
automatically results in reversal of a conviction and remand for 
3 
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withdrawal of a guilty or no contest plea2. In short, the 
question here, as it was in another case in which this Court 
granted certiorari, State v. Gentry. 797 P.2d 456, 459 (Utah Ct. 
App.), cert, granted, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)3, is whether the 
court of appeals erroneously read Gibbons as replacing the 
traditional "record as a whole" test with a "strict compliance" 
test as the test applied on appellate review of the validity of a 
guilty plea (i.e., whether it was knowing and voluntary).4 
The "record as a whole" test, as a test applied on 
review, allows an appellate court to let stand a guilty plea 
where the trial court has not strictly complied with rule 11 and 
Gibbous but where the record, viewed in its entirety, establishes 
2
 For convenience, the State from this point forward will 
refer only to "guilty pleas," with the understanding that this 
reference includes "no contest" pleas. 
3
 After certiorari was granted, the case was dismissed due 
to Mr. Gentry's death, which rendered the issue moot. 
4
 When the trial court has denied a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea, the appellate court will not disturb the trial 
court's determination that the defendant has failed to show good 
cause for withdrawal unless there has been a clear abuse of 
discretion. State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987). 
As a practical matter, a "strict compliance" test is inconsistent « 
with the abuse of discretion standard of review established in 
Mildenhall, in that a trial court would never have discretion to 
deny a motion to withdraw when it had not strictly complied with 
rule 11 in taking the plea. But see State v. Truiillo-Martinez, 
162 Utah Adv. Rep. 64, 65 (Utah Ct. App. June 7, 1991) (which 
apparently found no incongruity in applying a "strict compliance" < 
test and the abuse of discretion standard of review: "It is an 
abuse of discretion to refuse to allow a defendant to withdraw a 
guilty plea which was not made in strict compliance with Rule 
11."). In other words, under a "strict compliance" test, the 
trial court is not free to exercise any discretion in determining 
the existence of good cause for withdrawal of a plea, as provided ( 
in Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (1990). 4 
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that the defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary. See, e.o.. 
Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989); State v. Copeland, 
765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988); State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 
(Utah 1986) (per curiam). On the other hand, the "strict 
compliance" test, as a test applied on review, requires the 
appellate court to automatically reverse a conviction and remand 
for withdrawal of a guilty plea if the trial court has not 
strictly complied with rule 11 and Gibbons, regardless of whether 
the record, viewed in its entirety, establishes that the 
defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary. Contrary to this 
Court's statement in its per curiam opinion in the instant case, 
Hoff did not address the critical question of whether Gibbons had 
replaced the traditional "record as a whole" test with a "strict 
compliance" test as the test applied on review. 
In Hoff, the Court addressed, inter alia, the specific 
question of whether Gibbons requires the trial court to strictly, 
as opposed to substantially, comply with rule 11 in taking guilty 
pleas. The Court's focus on this narrow question was prompted by 
an unfortunate argument in the State's brief (which was 
vigorously pursued at oral argument) that Gibbons only 
recommended "the best method of determining the voluntariness of 
a plea [and did] not impose a strict compliance test." Br. of 
Appellee at 8. That argument, understood by the Court to mean 
that Gibbons did not require the trial court to strictly comply 
with rule 11 but only to substantially comply with it, misreads 
Gibbons. The Court correctly rejected the State's position, 
5 
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which regrettably is not the position the State has consistently 
presented to the court of appeals in guilty plea cases. 
In the numerous cases before the court of appeals, the 
State, acknowledging that Gibbons requires the trial court to 
strictly comply with rule 11, has focused on the issue of what 
remedy should be imposed by an appellate court when a trial court 
has not strictly complied with rule 11, but the record as a whole 
establishes that the defendant's guilty plea was nevertheless 
knowing and voluntary. The State has consistently argued to the 
court of appeals that the validity of post-Gibbons guilty pleas 
should be reviewed under the traditional "record as a whole" test 
and not the "strict compliance" test, understanding, as discussed 
above, the radically different results that flow from those two 
distinct tests. That court definitively rejected the State's 
argument in a series of cases highlighted by State v. Pharris, 
798 P.2d 772 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 
1990)5, concluding that Gibbons, with its mandate that the trial 
court strictly comply with rule 11, requires an appellate court 
to reverse and remand for withdrawal of the plea where there has 
been any deviation from rule 11 and Gibbons, even if the record 
as a whole establishes that the plea was otherwise knowing and 
5
 Two panels of the court of appeals have recently departed < 
from the rigid approach followed in Pharris and have redefined 
"strict compliance" to include the trial court's use of a 
defendant affidavit which contains various rule 11 inquiries that 
are not restated verbatim by the court from the bench. State v. 
Smith, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 43 (Utah Ct. App. May 30, 1991); 
State v. Truiillo-Martinez, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 64, 66 (Utah Ct. ( 
App. June 7, 1991). 
6 
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voluntary. See Pharris, 798 P.2d at 774-78; State v. Maquire, 
No. 900045-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 16, 1990) (per 
curiam) (unpublished). In short, there could be no harmless 
error. 
Hoff, which involved a pre-Gibbons plea, did not 
address the specific question of what test applies in appellate 
review of a post-Gibbons guilty plea. Hoff answered two 
questions: (1) Did Gibbons mandate that the trial court strictly 
comply with rule 11 in accepting a guilty plea? and (2) What test 
applies in appellate review of a pre-Gibbons guilty plea? Hoff/s 
answer to the first question is discussed above. As to the 
second question, the Court reaffirmed that the "record as a 
whole" test applies to the review of a pre-Gibbons plea. Hoff, 
slip op. at 6-7. However, it left unresolved whether, under the 
Gibbons mandate that the trial court strictly comply with rule 
11, a post-Gibbons guilty plea is to be reviewed under a "strict 
compliance" test or a "record as a whole" test. 
In the instant case, as it did in its Gentry petition 
for certiorari, the State argues that Gibbons did not replace the 
traditional "record as a whole" test with a "strict compliance" 
test for appellate review of the validity of a guilty plea. 
Contrary to the Court's statement in its per curiam opinion in 
this case, Gibbons did not "adopt[] a 'strict compliance' test 
which superseded the 'record as a whole' test traditionally 
applied on review in cases dealing with knowing and voluntary 
guilty pleas." Maquire, slip op. at 1 (emphasis added). 
7 
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In Gibbons, this Court did not review either the trial 
court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or the 
voluntariness of the defendant's guilty pleas. Rather, the 
Court, in the context of remanding the case because an attack on 
the voluntariness of the defendant's guilty pleas had not be^n 
made to the trial court in the form of a motion to withdraw, 
concluded that "a statement of the law concerning the taking of 
guilty pleas in all trial courts in this state is appropriate." 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312. It then set out the specific 
requirements for taking guilty pleas under rule 11. Ibid. 
However, Gibbons did not even mention the "record as a whole'! 
test, let alone replace it with a new test, and the reason seems 
obvious: the Court was not reviewing the trial court record to 
determine whether Gibbons had knowingly and voluntarily enterled 
his pleas. Thus, Maquire's conclusion that Gibbons replaced the 
"record as a whole" test with a "strict compliance" test as t^ ie 
test on review reads far too much into Gibbons. Gibbons simply 
did not address that issue, and it is critical that the Court 
definitively resolve the question in this case. 
As the State has argued, a "strict compliance" testL 
with its automatic reversal component, is an unnecessarily 
inflexible approach which fails to consider the reality of the 
situation in many cases — i.e., that even though the trial court 
may not have strictly complied with each element of rule 11, ^he 
defendant's guilty plea was entirely knowing and voluntary. 
Thus, it is no surprise that this Court was so critical of sucjh 
8 
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an approach in State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1301-02 (Utah 1986), 
and that most jurisdictions apply a "record as a whole" rather 
than a "strict compliance" test in this context. See, e.g., 
United States v. Barry, 895 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1990) (district 
court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 does not warrant 
reversal where defendant's knowledge of rights waived was 
otherwise apparent); Wood v. State, 190 Ga.App. 179, 378 S.E.2d 
520 (1989) (where defendant was otherwise informed of rights 
waived, harmless error standard is applied to trial court's 
failure to comply with rule governing taking of pleas); People v. 
Bettistea, 181 Mich.App. 194, 448 N.W.2d 781, 783 (1989) ("record 
as a whole" demonstrated that plea was made knowingly and 
voluntarily); People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9, 459 N.E.2d 170 
(1983) (voluntariness of plea determined by considering all 
relevant circumstances surrounding it, not by judge's ritualistic 
recitation of rights waived). The "record as a whole" test 
simply is a more reasonable approach. 
Accordingly, the Court should grant rehearing, restore 
the case to the calendar for argument and resubmission6, and 
fully address the issue that was not resolved in either Gibbons 
or Hoff and which is squarely presented in this case: Which test 
applies in appellate review of the validity of a post-Gibbons 
guilty plea, "record as a whole" or "strict compliance"? 
6
 This case was never set for regular briefing or oral 
argument. Defendant is pro se. Because of the importance of the 
issue presented, if the Court grants rehearing, it would be 
appropriate to appoint defendant counsel for the purpose of 
filing a brief in response to the State's position. 
9 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should grant 
rehearing and restore the case to the calendar for argument and 
resubmission. Utah R. App. P. 35(c). 
The State certifies that this petition is presented in 
good faith and not for delay. 
DIS-
RESPECTFULLY submitted this c?3 day of July, 1991J 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON 
^Assistant Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (J 
Assistant Attorney General 
10 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OoOoo -
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. 
Brian E. Maguire, 
Defendant and Respondent* 
Third Circuit, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
Attorneys: R. Paul Van Dam, Judith S. H. Atherton, Salt Lake 
City, for the State 
Brian E. Maguire, pro se 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
PER CURIAM: 
On August 10, 1988, defendant Brian E. Maguire filed 
a motion to withdraw his no-contest plea to a charge of 
aggravated assault* The motion was denied. Defendant 
successfully appealed from the denial of that motion. In an 
unpublished memorandum decision, the court of appeals ruled 
that the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and with State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). The State petitioned for 
certiorari, which we granted, asking this court to decide 
whether the court of appeals had erroneously interpreted 
Gibbons. 
In Gibbons, this court adopted a "strict compliance" 
test which superseded the "record as a whole" test tradition-
ally applied on review in cases dealing with knowing and 
voluntary guilty pleas. 
On July 3, 1991, this court issued its decision in 
State v. Hoff, No. 900096, slip op. (Utah 1991), which is 
dispositive of the issue presented in this case. 
The decision of the court of appeals vacating 
defendant's conviction and remanding the case for a withdrawal 
of plea is affirmed. 
No. 900555 
F I L E D 
July 9, 1991 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
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